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Regression methods are commonly used in competition lawsuits for, e.g., determining overcharges in price-
fixing cases. Technical evaluations of these methods' pros and cons are not necessarily intuitive. Appraisals that 
are based on case studies are descriptive but need not be universally valid. This paper opens up the black box 
called econometrics for competition cases. This is done by complementing theoretical arguments with estimation 
results. These results are obtained for data that is generated by a simulation-model of a collusive industry. Using 
such data leaves little room for debate about the quality of these methods because estimates of, e.g., overcharges 
can be compared to their true underlying values. This analysis provides arguments for demonstrating that 
thoroughly conducted econometric analyses yield better results than simple techniques such as before-and-after 
comparisons.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes empirical methods that are increasingly used in the detection and prosecution of 
cartels   (for   an   overview   see,   e.g.,   Harrington   2008).  This   analysis   is   important   as,   first, 
“[e]conometric modeling has become the world standard for proving cartel damages” (Connor 
2008: 54). Regression techniques may, e.g., be used to decide, how much of an observed price 
change may be attributed to the cartel and how much is caused by other factors such as changes in 
production costs. Doing such a decomposition manually would require highly subjective and 
inexact judgment (Finkelstein and Levenbach 1983: 145). Second, analyzing the pros and cons of 
such methods is important as their application in legal proceedings may have considerable 
economic effects on the affected parties such as the payment of fines and/or the award of damages. 
Therefore, it is of crucial interest to the involved parties to have a sound knowledge about the 
virtues and shortcomings of these methods.
In this paper, I review some of these methods and apply them to the analysis of a particular 
cartel. Among other things, I show that calculating cartel overcharges by the use of econometric 
models yields estimates that are better and more reliable than estimates obtained by simpler 
techniques such as a comparison of average prices in collusive and competitive periods. Moreover, I 
show that estimates which are derived from a structural model of the industry tend to outperform 
estimates that are obtained from descriptive econometric analyses. Finding that an econometric 
analysis, which is firmly rooted in economic theory, outperforms simple comparisons is textbook-
knowledge for econometricians (see, e.g., Heij et al. 2004: 274). However, simplistic techniques 
such as the comparison of average prices are still in the debate for being used in competition cases. 
This can, e.g., be seen from their discussion in the recent EU-commissioned study on the 
quantification of antitrust damages (Oxera 2009: 49).
In presenting a simulation-model of collusive industries and econometrically analyzing its 
outcomes, this paper provides econometricians with a tool for pursuing two purposes. First, 
econometricians may obtain knowledge on the likely size of estimation errors that result from, e.g., 
inappropriate estimation-techniques or data that suffers from measurement errors. Second, this 
paper provides econometricians with a tool for defending the application of correct but sometimes 
complex econometric methods in an intuitively comprehensible way.
To illustrate the second point, consider that econometricians may explain the characteristics 
of their methods in three ways that differ in their levels of complexity and generality. First, 
mathematical proofs of, e.g., estimates' unbiasedness or efficiency provide valuable insights in the 
quality of econometric methods. Second, case studies of real cartels are valuable in illustrating the Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -3-
points of these proofs but lack generality. Third, case studies of simulated cartels combine the 
advantages of the two above methods. On the one hand, they are illustrative. On the other hand, the 
effects of collusion are perfectly observed in simulated industries and, thus, provide an ideal 
benchmark for a comparison of the estimated coefficients and an assessment of estimation errors, 
i.e., it addresses the first above purpose. This line of argumentation is detailed in the following 
paragraphs.
In competition cases, economic experts have a vital interest in explaining the pros and cons 
of their methods to an audience that has not necessarily been trained in econometrics. Doing this by 
providing mathematical proofs of estimates' unbiasedness and efficiency cannot be considered the 
most time-efficient strategy. One alternative is to illustrate the quality of a method by providing a 
case study or specific cases where a method has proven to be useful (see, e.g., Hausman (1984)). 
Regarding a particular case, one would like to argue that a method is good because a cartel caused 
an increase in prices of 17.72% and the method arrives at an estimated overcharge of 17.09%. On 
the contrary, another method is less favorable as its estimated overcharge is only 7.85%. However, 
with real case-data such a statement is impossible as the true overcharge of 17.72% is unknown. 
One may only assess the plausibility of estimates by applying statistical tests or economic 
reasoning. Hence, one may argue that the 95%-confidence interval around the first estimate is 
smaller than that around the second estimate. This implies a higher quality of the first method.
In this paper, I show that the first statement about the comparison of overcharges can be 
made when the illustrative case study is based on data of a computer-simulated, collusive industry. 
In this context, my paper bridges a gap in the literature because using simulated data enables us to 
perfectly   generate   the   counterfactual,   competitive   situation,   i.e.   the   situation   without   the 
infringement of competition laws. This allows for an exact calculation of, for example, the cartel-
overcharge, which is unknown in case of real data. Consequently, one may not only make a 
statement like the second – somewhat vague – one on confidence-bands. One may rather make the 
first, strong statement on the comparison of overcharges. Additionally, econometricians may learn 
the likely size of the error that is made by using misspecified variables. In the analyzed example, 
the overcharge-estimate may well decrease to a value of 4.55% (instead of the above, quite accurate 
17.09%) by misspecifying only four out of 56 cartel-periods.
Basing my results on such an analysis of a particular simulated industry, I show that a 
reduced-form regression, which is derived from the theoretical model of the industry, almost 
perfectly predicts the true overcharge. This result is not surprising as one would expect a regression, 
which perfectly depicts the industry, to yield very good results. The point of this exercise is to show 
that one must formulate a good theoretic model of the industry in order to attain such ideal results. Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -4-
As an alternative to identifying a model of this type, one might run descriptive regressions or even 
use simple comparisons of average prices. The below analysis indicates that such simpler methods 
do not necessarily predict the estimated effects well. One finds that for a specific sample-industry 
the estimate obtained by a naïve, descriptive econometric model underestimates the true overcharge 
by almost 10 percentage points while the comparison of collusive and competitive prices even 
indicates a cartel-related reduction of prices.
With this research I contribute to showing that the cogs and wheels of  econometric methods 
can be explained in an intuitive, accessible way. This, ideally, promotes the use of econometric 
analyses in competition cases. Even today, such sound scientific analyses are sometimes discarded 
in favor of subjective, personal experience as was the case in the German sour milk cheese decision 
(Monopolkommission 2010: 267, 269). In the market definition stage of this case, the judge 
disregarded econometric analyses concerning the substitutability of different types of cheese in 
favor of his own culinary experience.
In section 2.1, I provide a brief description of the simulation model that is used to generate 
the data. In section 2.2, I present the dataset that is generated by the simulation model. It includes 
data on costs, output, revenue, prices, profits, and market shares of the parties involved and of the 
other participants in the relevant market. Data of this type is considered helpful for competition 
analyses by the Directorate General Competition (DG Comp) at the European Commission (EU 
2010: 13). In section 3.1, I show how a reduced-form pricing equation can be derived for the 
industry of interest. This reduced-form pricing regression is estimated in section 3.2, where I also 
analyze the properties of the estimates. In section  4, I evaluate methods for the detection of 
collusion and the identification of periods in which the cartel was active and effective. Section 5 
concludes.
 2 SIMULATING COLLUSION
In section 2.1, I present a model of collusive industries with endogenous cartel formation. A more 
detailed description (of a previous version) of the simulation model is provided by Paha (2010). 
This model is used to generate data of collusive industries, which is described in section 2.2.
 2.1 The Simulation Model
Cartels are formed not only in industries for homogeneous goods such as cement but also in 
industries for somewhat differentiated products such as beer or bathroom equipment.
1 Therefore, 
1 The mentioned cases were investigated by the European Commission under the following case numbers: Bathroom 
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demand is assumed to be given by a representative agent's utility function that allows for modeling 
different degrees of product differentiation (Shubik and Levitan 1980). Vectors and matrices are 
denoted in bold. 




2]   (1)
In this function q0 is the outside option of consumers. q is a (n ´ 1)-vector whose elements are the 
quantities qi of n products. Each product is produced by exactly one firm, so that there are n firms in 
the industry. The number of firms is modeled as fixed. This may be motivated by sunk costs being 
sufficiently high such that there are no firms outside the industry for whom it would be profitable to 
enter. i is a (n ´ 1)-vector where each element takes a value of 1. v is a positive parameter and
∈[0,∞) represents the degree of substitutability
2 of the n products. According to this utility 
function the representative agent consumes some quantity of each good.
Each product is produced by a one-product firm at marginal cost ci. Marginal costs basically 
have two features: (i) They are firm-specific, which makes firms asymmetric. (ii) Cost-shocks are 
assumed to occur in every period such that marginal costs follow a random walk (Harrington 2008: 
241). This introduces dynamics to the simulation model. 
Marginal costs of firm i, i.e. ci,t, are generated according to equation (2) in conjunction with 
conditions (3) and (4). 
ci,t={
a1⋅a2i ,t⋅st if t=1









a4 ∈ ]0;1[ }
  (3)
The base level of marginal costs, i.e. in the initial period t = 1, is determined as the percentage a1 of 
the variable n, which is closely related to goods' reservation price. Cost-asymmetry among firms is 
modeled by adding a firm-specific term a2i,tst to the base level of marginal costs. The multiplicative, 
firm-specific technology-parameter a2i,t is drawn randomly from a censored normal distribution in 
the interval [a3;1]. The expected value E(a2i,t) is the mean of the interval [a3;1]. The variance m
-2 of 
marginal costs is modeled to decrease in the degree of product homogeneity m. This is because 
homogeneous products are produced by similar production technologies and, thus, at the same cost. 
2 For m = ∞ goods are perfect substitutes. For m = 0 goods are independent. As this paper is interested in analyzing 
(imperfect) substitutes, m is set at values greater than 0.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -6-
If production costs differed, the less efficient firms would want to exit the industry. This process of 
convergence is assumed to have happened in the past and is thus beyond the scope of the model. 
Cost shocks st are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval given by equation (4). 
a4 Î [0;1] determines the amplitude of cost-shocks. Setting a4 = 0 yields marginal costs that are 
symmetric across firms and constant over time. This interval ensures that marginal costs cannot 
become negative.
st ∈ {





ci,t−1] if t1   (4)
As in Harrington (2008: 241), marginal costs are assumed to follow a random walk in 
subsequent periods, i.e. t > 1. Thus, in every period t a random, scaled shock term st is added to the 
last period's marginal costs of each firm i. The marginal cost-shock st is the same for all firms and 
can be considered a fluctuation in input prices. It is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution in 
the interval  [−a4⋅minici,t−1;a4⋅minici,t−1] , where minici,t−1 is the minimum (over all firms 
i) of last period's marginal costs. Again, this ensures that marginal costs cannot become negative.
As is well known, a cartelist i may find it profitable to deviate from the collusive agreement 
and make deviation-profits pdi rather than cartel profits pi. Friedman (1971) shows that cartels can 
be stabilized in a dynamic game when firms play a grim trigger strategy. Hence, after an observed 
deviation all cartelists revert to the competitive equilibrium where firm i makes profits pci. It can be 
shown that cartel-firm i will not deviate from the collusive agreement when condition (5) applies. 
di−i
di−ci
≤⋅1−P   (5)
In equation (5), d=1/(1+r) denotes firms' common discount factor with discount rate r. P is the 
probability that the cartel will be discovered by the competition authority.
The evolution of cost-shocks may generate a distribution of costs where some firms in a 
previously stable cartel find it profitable to deviate from the collusive agreement. Therefore, firms 
are assumed to lower collusive prices in order to prevent deviations from the cartel. To see how this 
mechanism works, consider that the marginal costs of all firms are perfectly known to every other 
firm. Therefore, all firms can perfectly anticipate if (at prevailing prices) it would be profitable for 
any cartelist to deviate from the collusive agreement. If neither cartelist has an incentive to deviate, 
i.e. inequality (5) is satisfied for all cartel firms, they jointly set profit maximizing prices (making 
profit pjpi). If at least one cartel firm finds it profitable to deviate from the collusive agreement, I 
assume that the cartelists render a deviation unprofitable by setting prices in the current period at 
the level that would prevail under competition. Hence, I do not assume firms will lower prices until Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -7-
condition (5) is just equalized for all firms. Assuming a reversion to competitive prices (Fershtman 
and Pakes 2000) is convenient as it is difficult to determine the set of prices that satisfies condition 
(5) in equality for all firms. Therefore, it would be hard to imagine that firms can determine this set 
of prices. However, it is plausible that they coordinate on the one perfectly known stable 
equilibrium, i.e. the competitive equilibrium. This strategy is shown in equation (6).
i={









This modeling assumption as well as the firms' reaction is quite similar to the model by Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1986) with perfectly observable demand shocks. In contrast to Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1986), a preventive reduction of prices is not triggered by demand shocks but by cost shocks. 
Even if firms know that an existing cartel can be stabilized by the above trigger strategy, 
they need not have an individual incentive to join or form a cartel. This is because firms will often 
make higher profits pfi in the competitive fringe than they would in the cartel. The reason for this is 
that fringe-firms may expand their output-quantity under the cartel's price-umbrella while cartelists 
must reduce their output in order to raise prices. This freerider-effect is particularly strong for small, 
inefficient firms (Paha 2010). 
Prokop (1999) proposes that cartels can nonetheless be formed if firms play a mixed 
strategy. Every firm chooses a participation-probability ji that maximizes its expected payoff. This is 
equivalent to choosing a participation probability that, in the Nash-equilibrium, makes the 
competitors of a firm indifferent between joining the cartel or remaining outside. Solving for the 
Nash-equilibrium of the cartel formation game is difficult as these expected present values of profit 
depend on the expected size and composition of the cartel which, again, are a function of firms' 
participation probabilities. Paha (2010) shows that a solution can nonetheless be attained by a 
Differential Evolution stochastic search heuristic.
 2.2 The Simulated Dataset
The above model is used to generate data of a collusive industry as described in Appendix A.
3 
From the group of all generated industries, I pick one that gives (i) a stable cartel with price wars 
and (ii) whose price-overcharge takes a realistic value of 17.72% (see Table 1). The simulated 
goods are relatively homogeneous with a maximum price-difference between the cheapest and the 
3 For readers interested in reproducing the below regressions and calculations, I will be happy to provide the data in 
EViews-format on request. Please send an email to johannes.paha@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -8-
most expensive good of less than 7% in competition.
One might object by arguing that analyzing just one industry yields results that apply only to 
this specific industry. This is only true for the absolute value of the calculated effects. Other cartels 
in other industries may generate overcharges of a size other than the above 17.72%. Therefore, 
possible misspecifications in the econometric measurement of overcharges cause errors of different 
absolute values. However, when repeating the below calculations for different cartels one gets the 
same qualitative interpretation. In this context, a focus on just one industry does not reduce the 
meaningfulness of the qualitative results but may be considered more illustrative for the non-
econometrician.
A comparison of the numeric error may be done by calculating the error relative to the true 
underlying (e.g., the overcharge). This allows for a comparison of relative errors across industries 
that may differ in cost-structures, the price elasticity of demand, or the degree of product 
differentiation. Such a comparison is especially interesting for econometricians themselves as it 
allows for an empirical determination of the distribution of the relative error that is, for example, 
caused by a misspecified regression. Exploring such distributions requires extensive research as one 
can easily imagine at least three different frameworks for comparing relative errors. One might use 
(i) different cost-evolutions in the same cartel, (ii) different cartel-compositions in the same 
industry, or (iii) different cartels in different industries. Such extensive research heavily relies on the 
qualitative insights provided below for a single sample-industry and is beyond the scope of the 
present paper.
In the selected, infinitely lived industry T = 100 periods can be observed. These 100 periods 
can be thought of as quarterly data for a period of 25 years. The n = 9 firms are assumed to compete 
during the first 20 periods. At the beginning of period 21, they meet and agree on forming a cartel 
that encompasses all firms with the exception of firm 3. The time of the formation-meeting is 
exogenously given.  Although the cartel is active in periods 21-100, it is only effective in 56 of 
these periods. These collusive periods are characterized by good economic conditions, i.e. average 
marginal costs are only 24.34. The remaining 24 (price war) periods are economically stressful for 
firms because mean marginal costs amount to 36.04. Firms pass on some portion of the increase in 
production costs to consumers, which leads to higher prices. However, with price-sensitive 
consumers this pass-on is not perfect causing firms' profits c.p. to decrease. Additionally, in the 
above model with linear demand curves, higher prices imply a greater price-elasticity of demand, so 
that a deviator from the collusive agreement may attract much additional business by lowering his 
price. All three effects, i.e. higher prices and demand elasticities, as well as lower cartel-profits, 
raise cartelists' critical discount factor and, hence, their desire to deviate from the collusive Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -9-
agreement. This would cause the breakdown of the cartel. The existence of the cartel is preserved 
by temporarily reverting to the competitive equilibrium, which renders deviations unprofitable.
Table 1 shows the average effects of the cartel on the prices of both cartel- and fringe-firms 
(i.e. the overcharge), as well as the quantities and profits in the periods during which the cartel is 
effective. These effects are calculated as the difference of a variable between its collusive and its 
counterfactual, competitive value divided by the collusive value. These values highlight one of the 
advantages of using simulated data. With real data, the competitive  but-for  values of prices, 
quantities, and profits would be unknown. One clearly sees how cartelists reduce quantity in order 
to raise prices while the fringe firm expands its quantity and price under the cartel's price umbrella. 
Note that the fringe-firm is the least efficient firm which renders its percentage increase in profits 
lower than that of the cartelists.
Cartel firms Fringe firm
Change in price (oc) +17.72% +3.81%
Change in quantity -56.81% +36.83%
Change in profit +59.50% +47.09%
Table 1: Cartel Effects
The relative change in cartelists' price, i.e. the average overcharge oc, is computed as the 
mean (over all cartelists) of their average (over all effective cartel periods, i.e. non-price war 
periods) price-increase relative to the collusive price. The average overcharge is 17.72%. Following 
a recent meta-study of overcharge-estimates (Connor and Lande 2008) this is a modest overcharge.
Figure 1 provides an impression of the cartel's effect on prices. This figure displays the 
average price over all cartelists ± one standard deviation (dark gray time series) and the average 
marginal costs over all cartelists ± one standard deviation (light gray time series). Moreover, one 
sees the price (dashed line) and marginal costs (dotted line) of the fringe firm. The shaded areas in 
the background indicate the periods when the cartel was effective. From the figure, the following 
conclusions can be drawn.
1. In periods of price war, firms' prices are close to marginal costs. When the cartel is active, 
the fringe firm undercuts cartelists' prices.
2. The incentive to deviate from the cartel is especially high in stressful economic situations. 
This is the case when marginal costs are exceptionally high and/or dispersed.
3. With such pronounced cost-shocks it is difficult to detect collusion from analyzing time 
series of prices alone. When regarding the plot of both prices and costs, one might infer Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -10-
evidence of collusion from the fact that, e.g., in period 40 and 82 prices go up while costs 
decline. However, this movement of prices is similar for fringe- and cartel-firms, so that the 
two cannot well be discriminated.
 3 PRICING REGRESSIONS
Assume the following situation. A competition authority receives information that a collusive 
agreement might have been established in the above industry. The following analysis is concerned 
with evaluating how well the competition authority would be able to identify the effects of the cartel 
by employing econometric techniques. Such techniques have been reviewed by Harrington (2008: 
216), who states that “[v]erification of episodes of collusion is a data-intensive and time-intensive 
task that requires controlling for many determinants of behavior.”
In section 3.2, I present a reduced-form regression of prices on supply- and demand-side 
variables. Regressions of this type are commonly used in competition cases (Clark et al. 2004: 22) 
and allow for simulating counterfactual, i.e. competitive, prices in the allegedly collusive periods 
(Baker 1999: 389). This enables researchers to produce estimates of, e.g., the cartel's overcharge. I 
show that a regression of this type predicts the overcharge quite accurately under two conditions. 
Figure 1: Prices and CostsJohannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -11-
First, the fundamental parameters of the model must not change between collusive and competitive 
periods. Second, the estimated (reduced-form) model must be derived from a structural model that 
provides a good description of the industry's structure and firms' conduct. I explicate this point more 
clearly in section  3.1. There, I also show that the use of econometric techniques has decisive 
advantages over simpler methods such as the comparison of prices in competitive and collusive 
periods.
Throughout section  3  I assume that (i) the identity of cartelists is known and (ii) the 
researcher knows in which periods cartelists set collusive prices. This assumption can be motivated 
by the existence of hard evidence that provides such information. The assumption that Dt is known 
is relaxed in section 4, which is concerned with detecting the start of the cartel and cartelists' 
temporary reversions to competitive behavior.
 3.1 Deriving a Reduced-Form Pricing Equation
In section 2.1, I present a structural economic model that describes the industry under research in 
several dimensions (Reiss and Wolak 2007: 4304). (i) The economic environment is characterized 
by n firms who supply a differentiated product to representative agents. (ii) The structural model 
defines the  economic primitives  such as consumers' utility function  (1)  and firms' production 
technology (2)-(4). (iii) The model is characterized by exogenous variables such as the degree of 
product differentiation m and consumers' willingness to pay, as represented by variable v. (iv) The 
industry is assumed to be infinitely lived with utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing 
firms. (v) The equilibrium solution concept is a Nash-equilibrium with price as firms' strategic 
variable, while firms face price-taking consumers.
Structural-form   econometric   modeling   is   concerned   with   identifying   the   structural 
parameters of demand and supply in an industry. Such parameters can be, e.g., marginal costs, 
price-elasticities or modeling parameters such as the parameters m and v, and/or the cost parameters 
a1, E(a2), a3, and a4 as in case of the above model. As such, the structural model consists of a system 
of several simultaneous equations where a variable may appear as a dependent variable in one 
equation and as an explanatory variable in another equation. For example, marginal costs are a 
dependent variable in equation (2) but an explanatory variable in firms' reaction function.
4
Structure can be imposed on these models in basically two ways, i.e. by making economic 
and/or statistical assumptions. Economic structural assumptions include assuming functional forms 
for demand and costs, and supposing that firms compete in, e.g., prices or quantities. These 
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assumptions are summarized in the system of equations (7) below. Statistical structural assumptions 
often relate to the distribution of the error term that is added to the regression equations. These 
assumptions are made in order to (i) reflect economic realities, (ii) rationalize what is observed in 
the data, and/or (iii) simplify estimation (Reiss and Wolak 2007: 4285).
After obtaining the structural parameters of an industry, a competition authority can do 
counterfactual simulations such as determining firms' prices with and without the collusive 
agreement. However, estimating these parameters of the structural model is rarely a simple task. 
Often it cannot even be done due to the limited availability of data or due to time-constraints in real-
world competition cases. It is typically easier, and thus more common in practice (Clark et al. 2004: 
footnote 38), to estimate a reduced-form pricing equation.
Reduced-form models may also consist of a system of simultaneous equations. These are 
obtained by transforming the structural model in such a way such all endogenous variables are 
treated as dependent variables. These are regressed on exogenous variables only (Reiss and Wolak 
2007: 4293). One example for this is a reduced-form pricing regression, in which the price of a 
good is regressed on “variables related to cost, demand, and market structure, and a series of 
indicator   (dummy)   variables   that   allow   the   intercept   to   differ   among   relevant   groups   of 
observations” (Baker 1999: 391).
From the model outlined in section 2.1, one may derive a vector of equilibrium-prices pt and 
a vector of marginal costs ct as presented in the system of equations (7) (for details see Paha 2010: 
5). ct follows from equations (2)-(4). pt is the vector of profit-maximizing prices when consumers 
behave according to utility-function (1) and when firms maximize profits à la Bertrand.
pt = X t
−1[nvY t⋅ct]
ct = ct−1a2, t⋅st
  (7)
The matrices Xt and Yt are defined as follows. 
X t = I2n2n−−'Dt A
Y t = nn−− Dt A
  (8)
Dt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when firms have formed a cartel and do not engage in 
a price war, and a value of 0 otherwise. In this section, Dt is assumed to be perfectly observed by the 
researcher. This assumption is relaxed in section 4. I is an (n´n)-identity matrix. i is an (n´1)-vector 
of ones. A is a matrix of dimension n´n. Its elements ai,j take a value of 1 if both firms i and j are 
cartel firms, and a value of 0 otherwise. 
In the following, the equations in (7) are used to derive the reduced-form pricing equation 
(9) of the above model. This is done by solving the pricing-equation of pt-1 for ct-1 and plugging the Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -13-
resulting term in the equation of ct. Inserting this term into  pt yields the reduced-form pricing 
equation (9). 
pt = X t−1
−1 I−Y tY t−1
−1 nv  X t−1
−1 Y tY t−1
−1 X t pt−1  X t−1
−1 Y t a2,t st   (9)
The decisive advantage of pricing-equation (9) is that firms' prices in period t are expressed 
as a function of prices in period t-1. However, they do not depend on marginal costs. This is 
advantageous as prices can easily be observed while marginal costs are often unknown to the 
econometrician. A further explanatory variable is the common cost-shock st that affects the marginal 
costs of all firms.  I assume that this common cost-shock is observed by the researcher who may, 
e.g., analyze input prices or price-indices that are provided by statistical offices. However, the 
researcher does not observe the firm- and time-dependent scaling parameter a2i,t. This unobserved 
heterogeneity transforms the deterministic relationship  (9)  into a stochastic one  (10). This is 
reflected by adding the i.i.d. error term ei,t to the regression equation.  The a-, b-, and g-variables are 
the coefficients of the regression that are estimated in section 3.2.
pi,t = iDt−Dt−1  1 pi ,t−1 
2,i pi,t−1Dt−Dt−10  3,i pi,t−1Dt−Dt−10 
1,i stDt−Dt−10  2,i stDt−Dt−10 
3,i stDt=Dt−1=1  4,i stDt=Dt−1=0  i ,t
  (10)
The first summand in (10) is a constant which measures the effect of moving from the 
competitive equilibrium in period t-1 to the collusive equilibrium in period t, or the other way 
around. Only in these switching periods does the coefficient ai take a value greater than zero. This 
value provides a measure of the average absolute change in prices that firm i brings about as a 
consequence of the cartel being active. Equation (9) implies that ai only varies with the affiliation 
of firm i to the group of cartel-firms or the group of fringe-firms. Hence, ai must take one value for 
all cartelists and another value for all firms in the fringe. All other firm-specific effects are 
accounted for by the remaining coefficients. Economic theory predicts that fringe firms charge a 
lower overcharge than cartelists and, thus, profit from increased prices and an increased quantity 
sold. Therefore, the value of ai should be smaller for fringe-firms than for cartelists. Equation (9) 
implies that the entire summand should be zero when firms either continue behaving competitively 
or collusively from period t-1 to period t. To see this, consider that in this case, the condition Yt = Yt-
1 applies, such that (I-YtY
-1
t-1) turns out to be a matrix of zeros.
In times when firms do not change their competitive conduct from period t-1 to period t, 
firms take their price pi,t-1 as a base value (see the second summand in (9)) and only adjust it by the 
factors (here in particular production costs) that have changed between these two periods (see the Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -14-
third summand in (9)). Equation (9) simplifies to (11), because in these periods the conditions Yt = 
Yt-1 and Xt = Xt-1 apply.
pt=pt−1X t−1
−1 Y tat st   (11)
In this case, the estimated coefficient b1 in (10) should take a value of one. Finding a statistically 
significant value of   b1 ≠ 1 would indicate misspecification of the model due to, e.g., omitted 
relevant variables. When moving from collusion to competition, the value of pi,t-1 is elevated by the 
overcharge. Therefore, it is incorrectly high when being used as a base value for determining pi,t. 
This effect is considered by including the variable ((Dt-Dt-1)>0) that takes a value of one when 
moving from collusion to competition, and a value of zero otherwise. For the coefficient b2,i of this 
variable, one expects (i) a negative value that is (ii) the same for all cartel-firms and a (iii) 
somewhat higher but, again, identical value for fringe-firms. When moving from competition to 
collusion ((Dt-Dt-1)<0), this effect is reversed. This can be seen from coefficient  b3,i, which is 
expected to be greater than zero. The equality of these effects for cartelists on the one hand and 
fringe firms on the other follows directly from equation (9).
5
The third term in equation (9) requires the inclusion of four dummy variables in regression 
(10). These dummies capture the effect of the cost-shock st on prices in the following four types of 
periods: (i) Transition from collusion to competition (g1,i), (ii) transition from competition to 
collusion (g2,i), (iii) collusion in both periods (g3,i), and (iv) competition in both periods (g4,i). Again, 
the term X
-1
t-1Yt implies that the values of g1-g4 differ for the group of cartelists and the group of 
firms in the fringe. Multiplying this product with the vector of firm-specific technology-parameters 
a2,t  would imply a firm-specificity of  g1-g4  only if the values of  a2  were persistent over time. 
However, as the values of a2 evolve according to a random walk, the condition E(a2,i) = E(a2,j) 
applies for all firms i and j. Consequently, g1-g4 only depend on the affiliation of a firm to the cartel 
or the fringe but do not differ across firms in either of these two groups.
Estimating a reduced-form equation is typically easier than estimating the structural model. 
Therefore, reduced-form estimations are frequently used in competition cases (Clark et al. 2004: 
footnote 38). An estimation of equation (10) is provided in section 3.2. If the parameters of the 
structural model – such as the number of firms n or the degree of product homogeneity m – remain 
constant over the period of observation, reduced-form estimations are a valuable tool for 
determining counterfactual values of, e.g., prices. However, if these parameters change, the matrices 
5 To see this even more clearly, one may choose arbitrary values for n and m, and consider an arbitrary composition of 
the cartel. Then, writing equation (9) in non-matrix notation for collusive periods, competitive periods, and 
transition-periods supports the above statements.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -15-
Xt and Yt change over time. In this case, the parameters of the reduced-form model cannot be 
estimated consistently. Therefore, one would want to estimate the structural model and account for 
the changes in its parameters. This allows for simulating the effect of the structural change on 
market outcomes. Some refer to this approach as simulation method or market-structure-based 
method (Oxera 2009: v, 83). The step of estimating the coefficients of the structural model is 
needed to numerically calibrate the model to the features of the industry under examination. In the 
above case, no structural changes occur. Hence, I present the reduced-form estimation only.
 3.2 Estimation and Comparison of a Reduced-Form Pricing Equation
Table 2 presents the results of the reduced-form regression (10) for the industry described in section
2.2. The equation is estimated by a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) panel-regression. The 
second column presents the regression-coefficients for all firms. The third column indicates by how 
much the coefficients of the fringe-firm deviate from the common coefficient. As an example, for a 
cartelist, one finds acartel=11.070, while for a fringe firm afringe=11.070-5.712=5.358 applies. 
One finds that this regression is of a very 
high quality because all coefficients take the 
expected values and signs as described in 
section  3.1. The value of the coefficient of 
determination   R²   is   higher   as   one   would 
expect for real data. This is because simulated 
data is neither affected by measurement errors 
nor by firms who, e.g., set sub-optimal prices 
due to information asymmetries. Hence, there 
is little white noise in the data in the sense of 
firms not behaving perfectly according to the 
above structural model.
I   use   this   regression   to   determine 
estimates of firms' counterfactual, competitive 
prices and their overcharges.
6 One obtains an 
average overcharge for cartel firms amounting 
to 17.09% as compared to the true overcharge 
of   17.72%   (see  Table   1).   Therefore,   the 
estimated overcharge is quite close to its true 
6 The calculation is done as follows: One observes that firm 1 sets a collusive price p1,42=31.994 in period 42 and a 
collusive price of  p1,43=31.173 in period 43. The common cost-shock in period 23 is s43=-1.354. Applying the above 
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underlying. With a value of 8.92%, the model overestimates the overcharge of the fringe firm, 
whose true value is 3.81%. This is mainly due to the fact that there is just one firm in the fringe so 
that only little variation in the data can be used to infer the behavior of fringe-firms.
The high predictive value of the regression has several reasons. These may be formulated as 
requirements for good reduced-form pricing regressions.
1. Ideally, pricing regressions should be based on reduced-form equations instead of having a 
descriptive nature. Hence, the regression-specification should be derived from a structural 
model of the industry under research.
2. The assumed structural model must be a good description of the industry's characteristics 
and its firms' conduct.
3. A reduced-form regression can only be applied when there is no structural change in 
industry-characteristics and firm-behavior.
To see the importance of the first requirement – deriving the regression-specification from a 
structural model – consider a linear pricing regression as shown by equation  (12)  which is 
sometimes referred to as the dummy variable model (Clark et al. 2004: 22). 
pi,t=wi ,tyi ,thi ,tDi ,ti,t   (12)
Regressions of this type are among the earliest econometric analyses in competition cases (see, e.g., 
Finkelstein and Levenbach 1983: 153ff.) that have been frequently applied since then. Baker (1999: 
393) even considers a regression of this type to be a typical example of a reduced-form pricing 
equation.
7
In this notation, a is a constant. wi,,t is a vector of variables that affect cost (e.g., the above 
cost-shock st).  yi,,t is a vector of variables affecting demand (e.g. the price of substitute products). 
hi,,t is a vector of variables related to market structure (e.g. seller concentration or measures of entry 
conditions). The variable Di,t is a vector of dummy variables that allow the intercept a to vary 
among relevant groups of observations (e.g. the dummy variable Dt that indicates whether a cartel 
was effective in period t).
When specifying such a dummy variable model, one must be extremely careful as to which 
regression, one predicts a hypothetical competitive price of  pc,1,43=−11.07010.194⋅p1,420.717⋅s43=26.16 . 
From the industry-simulation, one can infer the true competitive price pc,1,43=25.956 that would be unknown in a real 
case. Therefore, the predicted price is found to be a good predictor for its true underlying.
7 Please note that the variables used for the coefficients of the regression have a different meaning in equation (12) 
than in equation (10) above. On the one hand, this choice is made for reasons of parameter parsimony and, on the 
other hand, for being more in line with Baker's (1999) notation.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -17-
variables   to   include.   When   estimating   the   model   for   competitive   periods   only,   including 
competitors' prices in yi,,t can be helpful. When estimating the model for collusive periods, including 
these prices may cause the estimated coefficients to be biased. This is especially the case, when the 
effect of collusion on prices is not (appropriately) considered in the regressors and, thus, shows up 
in the error term. Then, the prices of other firms will be correlated with the error term (Clark et al. 
2004: 23). A similar argument can be made for the vector ht. It contains variables related to market 
structure such as concentration measures and market shares. The values of both measures are 
affected by collusion. As cartelists restrict their output quantity, their market shares decline while 
fringe firms' quantity and market shares increase. This raises the asymmetry across firms and drives 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-index (HHI) up. The resulting correlation of concentration measures 
and the error term in collusive periods causes the coefficient d to be biased.
Starting with equation  (12)  and 
after a few steps of model-selection, a 
researcher may end up with a regression 
such as the one presented in Table 3.
8 
One would economically interpret this 
regression as follows: Firm  i  takes its 
price in period t-1 as a base value for its 
price   in   period  t  (Finkelstein   and 
Levenbach 1983: 159). This base value 
is biased upwards if the market in t-1 is 
characterized   by   collusion.   This   is 
econometrically   reflected   in   the 
interaction term pi,t-1Dt-1. This base price 
is adjusted by the changes that occurred between period t-1 and t, i.e. cost shocks st, and collusion 
Dt. 
The pros of this naïve approach are twofold. First, one arrives at an economically sensible 
regression-specification by employing purely statistical techniques in addition to some economic 
thinking. Second, this regression provides estimates of mean overcharges at a reasonable order of 
8 In particular, I started with a specification that closely resembled the final specification in Table 3 but included firm-
specific interaction effects for all firms. By successively applying F-tests it was possible to show that the fringe firm 
is the only one for whom the coefficients of pi,t-1Dt-1 and Dt differ from those of the other firms in a statistically 
significant sense. Including the prices of competitors and the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index supports the above 
proposition of biased estimates as these variables are correlated with the error term. The consequence can be seen 
particularly well in the coefficient of pi,t-1 that is biased away from its economically plausible value of one.
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magnitude, i.e. 7.85% for cartelists and 3.71% for fringe firm 3. 
The cons of this naïve approach are the following: First, its overcharge-estimates do not 
match the true overcharges as well as those obtained from the reduced-form regression (10). In fact, 
the estimated overcharge is about 56% (9.87 percentage points) lower than the true overcharge. This 
is because the naïve model does not appropriately reflect changes in firms' behavior. To name one 
example, the naïve model does not reflect the fact that in the case of effectively colluding firms, 
cost-changes are passed on to consumers to a lesser degree than in the case of competition. It is 
needless to say that with sufficient efforts even this naïve approach might finally yield the correct 
regression specification (10). However, the correct specification can be much more easily derived 
from an adequate theoretical model of the industry. A second disadvantage of the naïve regression-
approach is that the researcher can hardly form expectations about the sign and absolute value of the 
estimated coefficients. These expectations are necessary for testing the plausibility of the estimates.
One may summarize that a more descriptive econometric approach as shown in Table 3 is 
not necessarily doomed to fail. In contrast, it may well deliver reasonable estimates of cartel-
overcharges. However, if the researcher has a good theoretical understanding of the industry's 
structure, he does well in obtaining a truly reduced-form model from the structural model of the 
industry. In the above example, using a structural model as a basis for the pricing regression makes 
the difference between a  0.63- and a 9.87-discrepancy (in percentage points) between estimated 
and true overcharges.
Additionally, I argue that an econometric estimation of overcharges is generally preferable to 
conceptually simpler methods. To see this, a “period of collusive activity can be compared with (1) 
a competitive period prior to the beginning of such activity; (2) a “white sale” period within the 
collusive period, or (3) a period after the termination of the conspiracy” (Finkelstein and Levenbach 
1983: 161). In competitive periods (i.e. periods 1-20 plus the price war periods), a cartelist charges 
an average price of 40.01. In collusive periods, the average price of cartelists is at a level of 31.18. 
This implies an undercharge of 28.32%. Based on these “estimates” the defendant's lawyer might 
argue that the cartel was not effective at all. However, we as omniscient observers know that the 
cartel was effective, charging an average overcharge of 17.72%.
How can this puzzle be resolved? In periods with high marginal costs of production, margins 
are low and cartelists have a high incentive to deviate from the cartel (see section 2.2). Firms end up 
in a price war, setting prices competitively. However, these competitive prices are nonetheless set at 
high levels because of the high production costs. When production costs decrease, it becomes 
profitable for firms to restore collusion. The low level of production costs allows firms to set 
collusive prices which are even below their previously competitive levels. As all these effects occur Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -19-
in an artificial, simulated industry, it is easy to determine the true competitive price level in periods 
where collusive behavior is observed. This price level is 25.99.  Comparing this unobserved, 
competitive price level to the observed cartel-price of 31.18, one gets an overcharge-estimate of 
16.65%. There is no chance to obtain this value employing the above simple comparison of prices. 
Not surprisingly, even the naïve regression in Table 3 outperforms the simple comparison of prices.
 4 DETECTING COLLUSION
An important input parameter to pricing-equation (10) is dummy-variable Dt that measures which 
firms participated in the cartel and in which periods the cartel was active and effective. In the 
previous section, I assume that the researcher has perfect knowledge about  Dt. To see the 
importance of defining Dt correctly, consider that misspecifying Dt does result in biased regression-
coefficients and, thus, biased overcharge estimates.
9 Ideally, the researcher can infer Dt from hard 
evidence such as protocols of cartelists' meetings that were seized by the competition authority. 
However, such evidence need not necessarily be available, complete, or reliable. In these cases, one 
might want to employ statistical tests that, e.g., are designed to detect breakpoints in time-series or 
identify changes in the behavior of firms, which is described by the coefficients of pricing 
regression (10).
Section 4 presents and evaluates methods for specifying the dummy-variable Dt. In doing so, 
one must answer two questions. First, did firms in the industry under investigation behave 
collusively? If yes, which firms participated in the cartel? Second, in which periods did cartelists set 
jointly profit-maximizing prices? Methods for answering the first question are presented and 
evaluated in section 4.1. Section 4.2 is concerned with the second question.
 4.1 Detecting Cartelists
One possibility to detect if a firm behaved collusively is to compare its behavior to some 
competitive benchmark. (i) Benchmark values can be provided by a theoretical model of the 
industry as is shown below. Other benchmarks can be provided by competitive markets of (ii) 
similar goods or in (iii) other geographic areas. Further benchmarks are provided by (iv) fringe-
firms in the same market or by (v) the behavior of cartelists in indisputably competitive periods.
Such benchmark-comparisons are conducted by estimating a pricing-regression under the 
hypothesis of competitive behavior and test whether the estimated coefficients match a competitive 
9 Suppose that the above cartel was found to have been active in periods 21-24, 39-73, and 82-100. This specification 
only neglects one cartel-period and three price war periods in times, where short price wars interrupt longer cartel-
periods. Estimating equation (10) with this faint misspecification results in a downwards biased overcharge estimate 
of 4.55%.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -20-
benchmark (Harrington 2008: 222). Rejecting this hypothesis with statistical tests provides evidence 
that firms did not behave competitively. In the above model, equation  (9) indicates that firms' 
pricing behavior in clearly competitive periods can be mathematically described by reduced-form 
pricing regression (13).
pi,t = ii pi,t−1isti ,t   (13)
After estimating equation (13) for the period under research, the estimated coefficients ai, bi, and gi 
may be compared to the above competitive benchmarks. The comparison to benchmarks (i), (iv) 
and (v) is illustrated below. In addition to detecting non-competitive behavior, equation (13) may be 
used to detect structural breaks in the pricing behavior of firms. This helps to identify in which 
periods cartelists behaved non-competitively, which is done in section 4.2.
I start with benchmark (i) for detecting behavior that is inconsistent with competition, i.e. I 
compare the estimated coefficients to their theoretical competitive values. The deterministic 
reduced-form pricing-equation (9) implies that in competition, the constant ai should take a value of 
zero. bi should take a value of one. gi measures to which extent cost shocks are passed on to 
consumers. Equation  (2) shows that the marginal costs of firm i rise on average by E(a2)st  in 
response to some cost-shock st. In perfect competition, firms set prices at the level of marginal costs 
as long as these are at or above average costs. Therefore, in perfect competition cost-shocks would 
be fully passed on to consumers, so that one would expect a value of gi = E(a2) (i.e. 0.76 in the 
above example). As the differentiation of products makes competition imperfect, cost-shocks are 
under-proportionally passed on to consumers so that one expects a value of gi in the interval [0; 
0.76].  In the following, I estimate equation (13) for periods t=1-100 and test whether the estimated 
coefficients match the predicted competitive values. The results of pricing regression  (13)  are 
presented in Table 4.
10 These results are obtained by a stacked OLS panel-regression.
This regression does not clearly indicate a deviation from competitive behavior by firms 1, 
2, and 4-9. The estimated constants are not significantly different from zero and the b-coefficients 
are close to one. Only the g-coefficients are perceptibly lower than the upper bound of the above 
interval [0; 0.76]. It is also not possible to reject the hypothesis that firms behave competitively. The 
p-values of two Wald-tests are relatively high, which leads to the inability to reject the hypotheses 
that (i) the constants ai jointly take a value of zero and that (ii) the b-coefficients jointly take a 
value of one.
10 Please note that the last column presents the regression-results of equation (13) for firm 2 in periods t=1-20. The last 
four rows summarize the results of tests for structural breaks. These results are not interpreted here, as they are used 
further below.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -21-
In the following, I assume that the competition authority knows that firm 3 had acted as a 
competitive fringe firm. This knowledge is supported by the above regression, as the estimation-
results for fringe firm 3 are closer to the above theoretical benchmarks than the estimated 
coefficients of the other firms. Therefore, I examine if firm 3 can serve as a competitive benchmark 
(i.e. the above benchmark (iv)) so that the other firms can be shown to have behaved in a 
significantly different, i.e. non-competitive, manner. An F-test indicates that the coefficients of 
cartelist 1 and cartelist 2 are identical with a probability of 99.96%. However, the probability that 
the coefficients of cartelist 2 and fringe-firm 3 are identical is only 72.27%. This is not low enough 
to reject the hypothesis (at standard confidence-levels) that cartelist 2 and fringe-firm 3 behaved in 
the same way. This finding highlights one drawback of this approach. When the cartel is active, 
fringe firms do not exactly behave as they would in competition. They rather expand their price 
under the price-umbrella of the cartel. Therefore, cartelists and fringe firms cannot be expected to 
behave very dissimilar.
Therefore, I resort to benchmark (v), i.e. comparing supposedly collusive behavior to clearly 
competitive behavior. The last column in Table 4 provides the results of the reduced-form pricing 
regression  (13)  for cartel-firm 2 during the clearly competitive periods 1-20. The estimated 
coefficients  b2  and  g2  provide good estimates of the theoretically true, competitive coefficient-
values. However, as the time series is relatively short,  a takes a value below zero that is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the quality of this regression must be considered too low to be 
useful for further statistical tests.
Table 4: Competitive Reduced-Form Pricing Regression (13)
firm 1 firm 2 firm 3 firm 4 firm 5 firm 6 firm 7 firm 8 firm 9 firm 2
0.416 0.445 0.090 0.423 0.428 0.409 0.468 0.431 0.472 -0.321
(0.500) (0.528) (0.465) (0.489) (0.493) (0.515) (0.516) (0.520) (0.527) (0.670)
0.988 0.988 0.998 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.987 1.008
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
0.531 0.537 0.626 0.544 0.546 0.538 0.536 0.537 0.549 0.730
(0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.011)***
R² 98.12% 99.75%
98.06% 99.72%
Information Criteria Wald Test p-value
3.173 75.09% -1.67
3.318 72.30% -1.52
H-Q 3.229 99.52% -1.65
recursive coefficients mostly correct
recursive residuals correct  
CUSUM incorrect (does not indicate structural break at all)
CUSUMSQ correct (no information about timing)
dependent variable  pi,t
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To summarize the above discussion, interpreting the values of the estimated coefficients 
supports  the assumption that firm 3 behaved competitively while all other firms  behaved 
collusively. However, the above statistical tests cannot reject the hypothesis that all firms behaved 
competitively. Nonetheless, such a finding must not be considered a proof of competition. It should 
be considered inconclusive evidence that requires further investigation.
 4.2 Detecting Collusive Periods
In the following, assume that the identity of cartelists and fringe-firms is known but the start of the 
cartel as well as the timing of price war periods is unknown. Therefore, I now address the second 
question, i.e. identifying periods where firms probably behaved non-competitively. This is done by 
performing four popular tests for detecting structural breaks in the data. These tests are (i) analyzing 
plots of recursive coefficients, (ii) analyzing plots of recursive residuals, (iii) the CUSUM-test, and 
(iv) the CUSUMSQ-test.
Before addressing these tests, I argue that the simplest test for detecting collusive periods is 
often unlikely to yield meaningful results. This test simply consists of looking at the time series of 
prices and identifying possible breakpoints by visual observation (Harrington 2008: 221). The 
inadequacy of this test can be seen by visually examining the prices of cartelists (dark gray line) in 
Figure 1  above. One would probably identify the price wars that start in periods 25 and 59. 
However, I doubt that one would correctly identify the start of the cartel-period in t=39, as the 
price-trend keeps falling, being driven by negative cost-shocks. One might object and argue that 
additional switches between competitive and collusive behavior can be found by identifying periods 
where costs decline but prices rise. This is clearly inconsistent with competitive behavior. Even for 
the above simple industry, this is a tedious exercise and is even more difficult in real cases in which 
goods are not produced by a single but by several input factors, where each has a unique evolution 
of prices. As a consequence, Harrington (2008: 219) suggests applying a statistical test for 
breakpoints in firms' pricing behavior such as the ones described below. 
To perform these tests, regression (13) must be run for each firm separately. This yields the 
same results as those presented in Table 4 for the stacked panel-regression. For ease of notation, 
equation (13) is rewritten as pi,t = Zi,tqi,t  + ei,t, where qi,t is the vector of regression-coefficients and 
Zi,t  is the vector of regressors. Here, the vector includes a constant, lagged prices, and the 
contemporaneous common cost-shock. All of the below tests for structural breaks rely on recursive 
regressions of equation (13). Therefore, a sequence of coefficient-vectors,   i,k1,  i ,k2, i ,T , is 
generated by running separate regressions for the k+1, k+2, ..., T first observations, where k is the 
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The first test for structural breaks relies on plots of these recursive coefficients and their 
standard errors. A structural break may be supposed if some coefficient   ,k*  moves out of the 
bound provided by    ,k*−1   plus or minus two times the standard error of    ,k*−1 . This is 
approximately equivalent to a 5%-level of significance. The plots of firm 1's recursive estimates are 
provided in Figure 2 in Appendix B. It is sufficient to provide the plots for one firm only because 
the figures of the other firms look very similar. This test of recursive coefficients correctly detects 
cartel-periods around the start of the cartel where many competitive observations and only few 
collusive observations are included in the regression. Therefore, the inclusion of collusive periods 
causes perceptible changes in the values of the coefficients. In particular, the test detects the start of 
collusion in periods 21, 37, and 39. As more and more collusive observations enter the estimation, 
the test indicates that a structural break has occurred but not necessarily when. The evolution of the 
coefficient gi provides some evidence of a structural change, as it moves from a level of about 0.73 
in competitive periods to the level shown in  Table 4  when all periods are considered in the 
regression. However, it provides exact information about the timing of neither collusion nor price 
wars.
Second, the results of this recursive estimation can be used for computing recursive 
residuals, i.e. one-step ahead prediction-errors.
i ,t= pi ,t−Z i ,t  i,t−1 .  (14)
Information about a structural break in period k* can be derived from a plot of recursive residuals. 
Hence, a structural break is assumed when wi,k* moves out of the bound provided by wi,k* plus or 
minus two times its standard error for k*-1. Based on this test, the start and end of all collusive 
periods is determined accurately from the regressions of all firms. This can be seen from Figure 3. 
The effect of collusion shows up in the error term quite perceptibly. However, the establishment of 
the cartel in period 21 only shows up as a very faint structural break. This is because marginal costs 
and, thus, prices had already been on the rise in the previous periods. In the same context, a 
structural break shows up in period 28 where prices dropped quite strongly because of a decrease in 
marginal costs. However, in this period cartel-activity did not change. 
These results indicate a conceptual difficulty in the use of structural break tests. They show 
all structural breaks and not only those related to the cartel. Therefore, the researcher needs to be 
able to identify those structural breaks that can be attributed to phenomena other than collusion. 
This is particularly important when structural breaks occur as a consequence of structural changes 
in the industry such as, e.g., the entry/exit of firms, mergers, technology shocks, or demand shocks. 
Therefore, the researcher must have good knowledge of the industry to determine whether an Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -24-
identified structural break can be attributed to such alternative explanations rather than to collusion 
(Harrington 2008: 220).
Third, the CUSUM-test provides a rather general test for a structural break, i.e. one which 
gives no indication of the time-period when the structural break may have occurred. A structural 
break is assumed if the cumulative sum of the above recursive residuals – each scaled (i.e. divided) 
by its standard error – differs significantly from zero in any time period t. Let the scaled recursive 
residuals be denoted by wi,t. The CUSUM-test does not detect a structural break for any of the above 
firms as can be seen from Figure 4. This failure of the CUSUM-test can easily be explained. When 
the cartel is established, the increase in prices shows up as a positive spike in the error term. When 
the cartel enters a price-war period, the decrease in price shows up as a negative spike in the error 
term. By summing up these errors, the effect of switching from competition to collusion and the 
effect of switching from collusion to competition cancel each other out.













which takes account of this effect by taking the square of the scaled recursive residuals, is therefore 
calculated. Again, one must reject the null-hypothesis of “no structural break” if the test-statistic Si,t 
exceeds some critical value. Figure 5 shows that this test indicates a structural break. This finding 
applies for all firms. However, due to the construction of the test, one gets no information about the 
timing of collusion.
In the case of cartels that become active and remain effective, one might also apply a Chow 
breakpoint-test to verify the supposed and unique structural break. This test compares the sum of 
squared residuals obtained by fitting a single equation to the entire sample with the sum of squared 
residuals when separate equations are fit to each sub-sample of the data (Chow 1960). However, 
this test is of little use for the above industry that is characterized by firms which switch frequently 
between competition and collusion.
In summary, one finds that (i) tests for structural breaks may be used to identify periods of 
competition or collusion in order to specify the cartel-dummy Dt. (ii) Some of these tests, such as 
the CUSUM-test, are practically never applicable for this use. (iii) Other tests can be applied in 
principle, but may – by construction – have drawbacks. For example, the CUSUMSQ-test is not 
suitable to identify the time of the structural break. The Chow-test is only a good choice when firms 
rarely switch between competitive and collusive behavior. (iv) When these behavioral changes Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -25-
occur frequently, tests that are based on recursive coefficients or recursive residuals may be 
valuable tools. (v) Generally, one should use several tests, which ideally provide complementary 
evidence. (vi) Before attributing a structural break to the formation or demise of a cartel, one should 
look out for other events that might possibly cause a structural break.
 5 CONCLUSION
Reduced-form pricing regressions are commonly used in the detection and prosecution of cartels. 
Based on the analysis of a simulated sample-industry, I provide evidence for the proposition that a 
pricing regression should be preferably derived from a theoretical model of the industry under 
research. In contrast, descriptive pricing-regressions may, at first sight, look like reduced-form 
regressions because they contain the same or quite similar variables. However, the functional form 
of a naïve descriptive regression may be inappropriate and/or miss the complex interplay of the 
included   variables.   Nonetheless,   my   analysis   illustrates   that   even   such   a   naïve   approach 
outperforms non-econometric approaches such as the comparison of prices in collusive and 
competitive periods.
Based on the above reduced-form regressions I perform tests of coefficients' statistical 
significance and tests for structural breaks in the data. These tests aim to identify cartelists and 
collusive periods. I show that such tests can suffer from two types of errors. On the one hand, there 
may be technical obstacles such as time series that are too short, or functional forms that 
inaccurately describe the underlying economic relationship. On the other hand, the testable 
hypotheses might be economically flawed. Sometimes it is argued that the behavior of fringe-firms 
provides a benchmark for the behavior of cartelists in the same market. I show that this benchmark 
may be used but is certainly imperfect. This is because fringe-firms adjust their behavior to the 
existence of their competitors' cartel and, thus, only behave quasi-competitively.
I arrive at these findings with a new and innovative method. I use a theoretically supported 
and detailed simulation model to generate panel-data of a collusive industry, and apply the above 
methods to this data. This approach is advantageous as it allows econometricians to use the 
generated data to explain and illustrate the pros and cons of their methods to non-econometricians. 
In doing so, the recipients need not go through the technical details of a regression-approach or 
resort to a formal proof that both are not necessarily easy to understand. Using examples based on 
simulated data is convenient, as the accuracy of estimates can be determined by a direct comparison 
of the estimated coefficient and its true underlying. This allows for an intuitive assessment of the 
results and is more meaningful than a case study where the empirical methods are applied to real 
case data. Such studies are less illustrative because the true value of, e.g., an overcharge is Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -26-
unknown.
Analyzing the properties of different empirical methods on the basis of simulated data has a 
further advantage other than simply being illustrative. One may also obtain quantitative estimates of 
both correctly specified and misspecified models and, thus, get an idea of the size of misspecified 
estimates' distortion. This can be seen from the above example. Therefore, future research might be 
directed at deriving the distribution of possible errors. Such distributions might be determined for 
(i) different cost-evolutions in the same cartel, (ii) different cartel-compositions in the same 
industry, or (iii) different cartels in different industries.
The   superiority   of   the   theory-based   reduced-form   pricing   regression   rests   on   two 
requirements. First, there must not be an (undetected) structural change in the data such as 
innovations, entry/exit of firms, changes in demand, or changes in the substitutability of products. 
Such changes would have to be accounted for in the specification of the pricing regression. 
Therefore, future research should be devoted to including such effects in the simulation model and 
deriving the pricing-regression accordingly. A second requirement for the superiority of the theory-
based estimation is its characteristic of being a good description of the underlying (simulated) 
industry. An important question for future research is how one would arrive at this model of the 
industry in reality.
This article constitutes a first step in the simulation-based analysis of econometric analyses 
in competition policy. Its contribution lies in providing a framework for such analyses. Moreover, it 
gives   a  first   indication   of   the   size   of   estimation   errors   that   are   caused   by  inappropriate 
specifications, techniques, or data. Analyzing these effects in greater detail constitutes an interesting 
avenue for further research.Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -27-
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Appendix A Generating a Collusive Industry
The dataset that is used in the above regressions is generated by running the simulation model with 
the parameter values given in Table 5. Except for the number of cartelists m, these parameter values 
are randomly determined from uniform distributions within the bounds provided by Table 5. 
n m n m a1 a3 a4 P r
lower boundary 7 50 1 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 0.05
upper boundary 15 150 100 1 1 0.15 0.4 0.25
selected value 9 8 56 18 0.85 0.52 0.12 0.16 0.05
Table 5: Parameter Values
Choosing  n  Î  [7,15] is reasonable because, first, all firms would join the cartel with 
probability 1 if the number of firms was too small. Second, the time for calculating the 
participation-equilibrium rises exponentially in the number of firms and, thus, would be undesirably 
long for n>15. From the viewpoint of economic theory, the size of n is irrelevant as it only affects 
the size of prices and quantities but does not have an impact on the ratio of profit-measures. Using 
mupper=100 as an upper bound is reasonable as it suffices to produce rather homogeneous goods. 
Choosing a1 Î [0.05,1.0] is reasonable because values below 0.05 would indicate that marginal 
costs are quite negligible. The production of such firms may be supposed to rather generate fixed 
costs that, however, are beyond the scope of this model.  Choosing  a4  Î  [0.05,0.15] gives 
economically meaningful yet not unrealistically large cost shocks. Drawing  P  from the wide 
interval [0.05,0.4] reflects our lack of knowledge about the effectiveness of competition authorities. 
This is because one knows the number of discovered cartels but can hardly determine the number of 
undiscovered ones. The interval encloses the 15-20% detection probability that some studies 
suggest. Choosing r Î [0.05,0.25] suggests that firms' discount rate is somewhere between the 
return of government bonds and some (ambitious) firms' target value of their return on equity. The 
number of cartelists m is determined endogenously as the mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium of the 
cartel-formation game. Johannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -30-
Appendix B Testing for Structural Breaks – Figures
Figure 2: Recursive EstimatesJohannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -31-
Figure 3: Recursive Residuals
Figure 4: CUSUM-testJohannes Paha Empirical Methods in the Analysis of Collusion -32-
Figure 5: CUSUMSQ-test